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Rußland und Deutschland in Europa 
Aktuelle Entwicklungstrends in den politischen und wirtschaftlichen 
Beziehungen 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 38/1997 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Rußland bilden ein wichtiges und 
unverzichtbares Element gesamteuropäischer Zusammenarbeit. Sowohl Bundeskanzler Kohl 
als auch Präsident Jelzin charakterisierten das jeweils andere Land wiederholt als 
"wichtigsten Partner in Europa". Dies trifft in unterschiedlicher Weise sicher zu. So ist 
Deutschland für Rußland der weltweit stärkste Handelspartner, während umgekehrt Rußland 
für Deutschland (und den Westen insgesamt) unverzichtbar ist, wenn es um die Neuordnung 
in Ostmitteleuropa geht. Dennoch gibt es in den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen auch 
Probleme, wozu kriegsbedingte Altlasten ebenso gehören wie unterschiedliche Vorstellungen 
über eine neue europäische Sicherheitsordnung und unzureichende Rahmenbedingungen in 
Rußland für ausländische Wirtschaftsaktivitäten. Der vorliegende Bericht befaßt sich mit 
Chancen und Problemen der Beziehungen Deutschland – Rußland in ihrer bi- und 
multilateralen Dimension. Dabei stützt er sich auf Originalquellen, wissenschaftliche 
Literatur und Beiträge aus der Publizistik beider Länder. 
Ergebnisse 
1. Die Interessen beider Staaten im Rahmen ihrer bilateralen Beziehungen und 
multilateralen Einordnung stimmen der Intention nach weitgehend überein. Deutschlands 
zentrales Interesse richtet sich darauf, daß Rußland als Partner in die internationalen 
Organisationen sowie die internationale wirtschaftliche Arbeitsteilung eingebunden wird 
und sich als konstruktive Großmacht an der Neuordnung Europas beteiligt. Dies trifft sich 
mit dem Interesse Rußlands, das darüber hinaus die Erwartung hegt, gerade Deutschland 
werde sich als der wichtigste Entwicklungs-, Transformations- und 
Modernisierungspartner Rußlands profilieren. Allerdings trägt eine Reihe einschneidender 
Asymmetrien zwischen Deutschland und Rußland dazu bei, daß trotz vielfacher 
gemeinsamer Grundinteressen immer wieder Friktionen zwischen den Partnern 
aufkommen. 
2. Auf multilateraler Ebene tritt die Bonner Politik kraftvoll für die internationale 
Einbindung Rußlands ein. Deutschland tut dies aber nicht als Schiedsrichter und neutrale 
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Mittlerinstanz zwischen Rußland und dem Westen. Vielmehr versteht sich Bonn als 
Fürsprecher Moskaus, der seine guten Dienste anbietet und innerhalb der westlichen 
Instanzen für sensitives Eingehen auf begründete Vorstellungen Moskaus wirbt. Als 
Beispiel hierfür geht der Bericht ein auf den G7-Weltwirtschaftsgipfel und dessen 
Umfeld, auf Aspekte der NATO-Erweiterung sowie auf Deutschlands Rolle bei der 
Ausarbeitung des Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsvertrags EU – Rußland. Die Frage 
lautet freilich: Wieweit will Rußland als selbstbewußte Großmacht überhaupt in 
internationale Organisationen integriert werden? 
3. Die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Rußland stehen heute ganz im 
Schatten der internationalen Entwicklungen. Dennoch sind sie von großer Bedeutung, bil-
den sie doch gleichsam das Unterfutter für die gesamteuropäischen Prozesse. Insgesamt 
ist die Bilanz gemischt: Die guten politischen Beziehungen erhielten nicht zuletzt durch 
den fristgerechten Abzug der "Westgruppe der Truppen" aus Deutschland vom August 
1994 Impulse. Bei der Liquidierung anderer Altlasten dagegen konnten ursprüngliche 
Zusagen und vertragliche Abmachungen nicht eingehalten werden, so daß es im deutsch-
russischen Verhältnis immer wieder Irritationen und emotionale Aufwallungen gibt. Dazu 
gehört vor allem der Komplex "Rußlanddeutsche" und der Streitpunkt "Beutekunst", auf 
den der Bericht näher eingeht. 
4. Frustrierenden Erfahrungen in den gegenseitigen Beziehungen "von oben" stehen jedoch 
vielfältige Aktivitäten "von unten" gegenüber: die zahlreichen Begegnungen der 
Menschen beider Länder, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen politischen, gesellschaftlichen 
und kulturellen Institutionen, Gruppen und Vereinigungen. Besonderes Gewicht kommt 
hierbei den mittlerweile 70 Städtepartnerschaften zu. Bemerkenswert sind auch die 
wachsenden Direktkontakte zwischen Regionen Deutschlands und Rußlands. 
5. Die großen Hoffnungen auf eine dynamische Entwicklung der deutsch-russischen Wirt-
schaftsbeziehungen nach Herstellung der deutschen Einheit haben sich bislang nicht 
erfüllt. Die Ursachen dafür liegen weit mehr auf russischer als auf deutscher Seite. Gewiß 
haben sich auch die mit der marktwirtschaftlichen Umstrukturierung der ostdeutschen 
Wirtschaft verbundenen Probleme nachteilig ausgewirkt. Vor allem aber sind es die 
ungelösten Aufgaben der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Transformation in Rußland 
nach dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR, die die ökonomische Zusammenarbeit behindern 
und die Rußländische Föderation auch für die Bundesrepublik zu einem schwer 
berechenbaren Außenwirtschaftspartner machen. Dies gilt für alle Schlüsselbereiche der 
deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Handel, Direktinvestitionen, technische Hilfe 
(Beratung), Finanzkooperation und paraökonomische Verbindungen. Bei letzteren handelt 
es sich um die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit zur Durchführung des deutschen 
Wohnungsbauprogramms für aus der ehemaligen DDR nach Rußland zurückkehrendes 
Militärpersonal. 
6. Was den bilateralen Warenaustausch anbelangt, so ist das vereinigte Deutschland mit ei-
nem Anteil von knapp 15% am russischen Außenhandelsumsatz gegenwärtig noch der 
wichtigste Wirtschaftspartner Rußlands im "fernen" Ausland. Umgekehrt ist Rußland an 
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der deutschen Gesamtausfuhr nur mit ca. 1,5% und an der Gesamteinfuhr lediglich mit gut 
2% beteiligt. Die Handelsbeziehungen wiesen in den letzten Jahren eine unterschiedliche 
Dynamik auf und blieben aufs Ganze gesehen hinter ihrem Potential zurück, das nicht nur 
in Anbetracht der positiven russisch-deutschen Handelstraditionen, sondern auch 
aufgrund des großen Modernisierungsbedarfs der russischen Wirtschaft und des 
gewohnten russischen "undertrading" erheblich ist. Eine gewisse Wende zum besseren 
zeigte sich 1996. Ein wirklicher Aufschwung wird aber immer noch vom unzureichenden 
Stand der systempolitischen Transformation in Rußland und vom zu langsamen Wandel 
der russischen Produktionsstruktur behindert, der bedeutet, den wenig dynamischen 
komplementären Charakter des deutsch-russischen Handels festzuschreiben. 
7. Wie beim Handel, so rangiert Rußland auch bei den Auslandsinvestitionen der deutschen 
Wirtschaft bis jetzt nur an hinterer Stelle. Die gegenwärtig bestehenden 
Investitionshemmnisse lassen sich stichwortartig wie folgt zusammenfassen: wachsende 
Sicherheitsdefizite aufgrund verbreiteter Kriminalität (Mafia-Syndrom); Häufung von 
Korruptionsfällen innerhalb der Behörden; rapider Verfall der Zahlungsmoral und der 
Vertragstreue, Fehlen einer konsistenten Wirtschafts-, insbesondere Außenhandelspolitik; 
krasse Widersprüche zwischen investitionsfördernden Vorschriften und der 
Steuergesetzgebung sowie Behördenwillkür bei deren Auslegung; Kompetenzgerangel 
zwischen der Zentralregierung und den Regionen. Solange hier mit keinen 
durchgreifenden Verbesserungen zu rechnen ist und die russische Regierung die 
Bedeutung eines attraktiven Investitionsklimas weiterhin unterschätzt, dürften sich 
deutsche Unternehmen nach wie vor zurückhalten. 
8. Die Bundesregierung bietet Rußland seit der dortigen Systemwende Beratungs- bzw. tech-
nische Hilfe im Umfang von ca. 100 Mio. DM jährlich an. Dabei geht es ihr nicht darum, 
einen sogenannten "deutschen Weg" zu vermitteln. In Übereinstimmung mit den von Ruß-
land festgelegten Prioritäten sind folgende Schwerpunktaufgaben erkennbar: wirtschafts-
politische Beratung zur Schaffung von Rahmenbedingungen und zum Aufbau 
mittelständischer Strukturen und Unternehmen; Hilfe zur betrieblichen Umstrukturierung, 
Privatisierung und Entflechtung; Aufbau eines Steuer-, Zoll-, Versicherungs- und 
Bankensystems; Beratung im Landwirtschaftsbereich; Aus- und Weiterbildung im 
Bereich des Wirtschaftsrechts; Hilfe beim Aufbau von Verwaltungsstrukturen; 
flankierende Beratung in den Bereichen Arbeitsmarkt- und Sozialpolitik sowie 
Umweltschutz. Die Bundesregierung hat außerdem vier regionale Schwerpunkte 
festgelegt, auf die sich das deutsche Beratungsprogramm nunmehr konzentrieren wird. Es 
sind dies das Gebiet Moskau, Stadt und Gebiet St. Petersburg, Tjumen und Wladimir. Bei 
der Umsetzung der Maßnahmen bedient sich die Bundesregierung der Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau. Weitere Vorhaben auf dem Gebiet der Beratungshilfe werden von anderen 
bundeseigenen Einrichtungen und der deutschen Wirtschaft durchgeführt. 
9. Fragt man nach den Perspektiven der russischen Außenwirtschaft im allgemeinen und 
nach der Zukunft der deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im besonderen, so kann 
kein Zweifel daran bestehen, daß ohne die Stabilisierung der Wirtschaftslage, ohne 
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adäquate Fortschritte bei der ökonomischen und politischen Systemtransformation und 
ohne nachhaltigen Strukturwandel kein dauerhafter Aufschwung der externen 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen möglich ist. Dabei muß die Aufgabe der Stabilisierung sowie des 
institutionellen und strukturellen Wandels von Rußland selbst gelöst werden. Westliche 
Unterstützung in Form einer vielfältigen, den besonderen Bedingungen der russischen 
Transformation entsprechenden Kommunikation und kooperativen Partnerschaft ist 
allerdings nicht zuletzt aus politisch-motivationellen Gründen nötig und – wenn sie 
konzeptionell gut begründet und effizient koordiniert wird – ökonomisch sicherlich auch 
nützlich. 
10. Ungeachtet der längerfristig wirksamen strukturellen Defizite und des anhaltend unbefrie-
digenden Standes der Transformation in Rußland haben sich Bundesregierung und deut-
sche Wirtschaft nach 1992 bemüht, Strategien, Institutionen und Instrumente zur Förde-
rung der russisch-deutschen Handelsbeziehungen und der Wirtschaftskooperation zu ent-
wickeln. Hinzuweisen ist auf die auf Regierungsebene getroffenen vertraglichen Regelun-
gen und die auf gleicher Ebene ins Leben gerufenen Institutionen. Unter den 
Einrichtungen der deutschen Wirtschaft, die eine zunehmende Rolle spielen, ist u.a. das 
am 5. März 1997 in Moskau eröffnete Deutsche Industrie- und Handelszentrum (DIHZ) 
zu erwähnen. Schließlich sind im Kontext der Förderung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
Instrumente zur Handelsfinanzierung zu nennen, wie etwa die traditionellen Hermes-
Exportbürgschaften und neue alternative Finanzinstrumente. 
11. Bilanziert man strukturelle Gegebenheiten und politisch-ökonomische Bemühungen, so 
lassen sich für die russische Außenwirtschaft im allgemeinen und für die deutsch-
russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im besonderen Szenarien benigner und maligner 
Entwicklungen unterscheiden. Das eine Extrem bildet das optimistische Szenario 
"Kooperationspolitische Trendwende durch erfolgreiche Systemtransformation und 
zügigen Strukturwandel", das andere Extrem läßt sich als "Weltwirtschaftliche 
Marginalisierung Rußlands als Folge anhaltender, wenn nicht gar zunehmender innerer 
Destabilisierung" kennzeichnen. Während das optimistische Szenario gegenwärtig als fast 
"undenkbar" erscheint, muß das pessimistische Szenario – leider – als düstere Möglichkeit 
und damit als wirtschaftliches und politisches Sicherheitsrisiko ins Kalkül gezogen 
werden. Gleichsam als realistisches Szenario erscheint die "Stabilisierung auf niedrigem 
Niveau mit Ausschlägen nach oben und unten". Die innerrussische Grundlage dieses 
Szenarios ist ein transformationspolitisches "Weiterwursteln" ohne klares und stabiles 
Profil auf seiten der Machtträger in Rußland sowie eine permanente Selbstanpassung der 
russischen Gesellschaft. Die Konsequenz für deutsche Partner wäre, daß zwar 
Kooperations- bzw. Handelschancen bestehen, daß aber viele Geschäfte mit großen 
Unsicherheiten verbunden bleiben. Dies bedeutet, daß das Geschäft mit Rußland nach wie 
vor große Risikobereitschaft, Improvisationstalent, genaue Kenntnis und permanente 
Beobachtung des sozioökonomischen Umfelds sowie verläßliche Partner "vor Ort" 
erfordert. 
Rußland und Deutschland in Europa 7 
1. Structural Elements of German-Russian Relations 
1.1 Positive Signals 
There are two powers that will contribute greatly to the future structures of Europe: Germany 
and Russia. The mutual relationship between "Europe's two biggest states" (Yeltsin) will 
decisively influence the outcome of the question whether the processes of reshaping Europe 
after the radical changes in Eastern Europe will lead to an all-European partnership and 
interdependence or rather create new lines of division or even stir up anew the old traditional 
contradictions. The future is open in as far as both countries in question are new states which 
have yet to determine their exact position within a Europe that is growing more and more 
together: here the reunited Germany looking eastwards after the transformation of Eastern 
Europe, and there the new Russia trying through painful internal struggles to define its 
relation to Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Against this background, is was an important positive signal that as early as in November 
1991 Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin signed a Common Declaration in Bonn which 
continued the German-Soviet treaty of November 1990 and stated the intention of both 
countries to "co-operate as closely as possible" and to "develop relations of friendship, good 
neighbourliness and co-operation in all aspects". This is based, among others, on the "belief 
in democracy as the only legitimate form of rule" as well as the orientation towards Europe 
"as a common region based on common values and anchored in the consciousness of the 
peoples".1 
There are two reasons why this general line envisaged so early and followed consistently up 
to today is so remarkable and forward-pointing. Firstly, it takes up the positive periods during 
the history of German-Russian relations swinging between processes of rapprochement and 
repulsion without repeating those phases where their partnership was mainly turned against 
other states and peoples. During the Hitler-Stalin pact relations between the two totalitarian 
states had become a frivolous complicity motivated by nothing other than reasons of power 
politics and aimed at submitting and dividing neighbouring states and characterised by deep 
mutual distrust. Secondly, the Common Declaration integrates German-Russian relations into 
processes of all-European co-operation while specifically emphasising common values and 
principles such as democracy, pluralism, respect of human rights and socially oriented market 
economy. This means a flat refusal to any new edition of political-culturally motivated special 
relations or a repetition of the geopolitical "axis" of the past. In any case, Germany commits 
itself specifically to help consolidating and integrating Russia because of Russia's weight and 
responsibility within the European integration process and not because of a special affinity to 
Russia on historical grounds. 
Opinion polls confirm that this "normalisation" of bilateral relations and of mutual perception 
takes place not only among the elites of both countries but also its population. Previously 
                                                 
1 Bulletin of the press and information bureau of the Federal Government (Bonn), 133/1991, p. 1082. 
8 Berichte des BIOst 1997 
people's assessments in both countries vacillated strongly between sympathy and antipathy. In 
Germany, for example, there were times of sentimental russophilia and times of fearful russo-
phobia. Today, this relationship full of emotions and tensions has largely disappeared. Ac-
cording to surveys in the autumn of 1996, 28 percent of Russians feel sympathy towards the 
Germans while 22 percent of those interviewed answered that they did not feel any special 
sympathy. On the German side, an equal 28 percent of those asked felt sympathy towards the 
Russians while 29 percent did not feel any special affection (all others were indifferent).2 
Such sober assessments are all the more favourable preconditions for fruitful German-Russian 
relations because on both sides they leave behind earlier fears and worries as well as 
excessive expectations which had to end in disappointments. 
1.2 Complementary Interests 
Three times this century, namely during the First, the Second World War and the Cold War, 
Germany and Russia faced each other as enemies or ideological adversaries. Today, there is 
the chance to put behind us this terrible heritage and to form anew our mutual relations, not in 
the nebulous sense of "sharing a common destiny" but as a partnership based on common 
values and complementary interests. This has become possible first of all due to the 
fundamental changes in the Soviet Union and Russia: together with the communist system 
Gorbachev dismantled also the Soviet Union's confrontation with the West and granted the 
peoples of Eastern and Central Europe including the Germans of the GDR the "freedom of 
choice". 
It will always remain Gorbachev's historic achievement that these revolutionary changes were 
brought about without violence – it could have been otherwise as was demonstrated by the 
freedom movements of 1953 in the GDR, 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia 
which were all crashed by Soviet tanks. It is noteworthy that the majority of Russians today 
(58 percent) consider German reunification to be legitimate – in contrast to other aspects of 
Gorbachev's Western policy which are seen as foreign political defeats. In any case, the "new 
– foreign political – thinking" in Moscow paved the way for Russia's partnership with 
Germany and with the West: with the troop withdrawal from Eastern and Central Europe, the 
Baltics and Eastern Germany the Soviet Union/Russia moved geographically towards the East 
in order to reach the West politically. And despite all course adjustments in detail Yeltsin 
follows this general line until today. Russia's turning away from "totalitarian illusions" lays 
down the groundwork, says the president, in order to consolidate trust between the peoples 
and establish co-operative relations between countries.3 
Of course, the partners' well-meaning intentions are not enough to build co-operative 
relations. Such relations will only be permanent and resistant to crises if they correspond to 
the interests of both sides and if these interests are more or less solidly intertwined. And true 
is that the best for a successful restructuring of relations is not to hide one's respective 
                                                 
2 M. Gorshkov/A. Chepurenko/F. Scheregi, Chto dumayut Rossiyanye o Germanii i Nemtsach, in: Nezavisi-
maya gazeta (Moscow), 20.11.1996. 
3 Speech in front of the Supreme Soviet, Radio Moscow, 13.2.1992. 
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interests but to formulate them clearly. Otherwise the danger of mutual misunderstandings 
will not be reduced. Which are then the central interests guiding Germany and Russia in their 
bilateral and multilateral relations? 
Germany has a great interest in seeing Russia develop into a strong, stable, economically 
healthy and therefore self-confident state which, however, must be based upon a democratic 
constitution and open to the world.4 The reasons for Germany's interest are obvious: a 
positive development in Russia would make for a reliable neighbouring country and partner 
in stability. Or the other way round: Europe can not be stable if Russia is instable. It is not a 
strong Russia that poses risks to others but a weak and uncertain one. The same is true for the 
economy: the more Russia furthers its economic modernisation and integrates itself into the 
world economy with a differentiated range of export goods the greater are the opportunities 
for Western industrialists to export into the huge country. And finally, Germany has a 
particularly strong interest to see Russia integrated as an indispensable partner into 
international organisations and to have the country participate as responsible, constructive 
great power in the restructuring of Europe. This would be a way to secure peace in Europe 
and help Germany in its attempts to enlarge the European integrative space to the east through 
a step-by-step advancement. 
Russia's specific interest in Germany results from the expectation that Germany acts as the 
country's most important partner for development, transformation and modernisation. With 
unification Germany has become a country in transformation itself and is therefore assumed 
to be particularly understanding for Russia's problems in this respect. In addition, Moscow 
hopes to find in Bonn the main addressee when it comes to including Russia politically, 
economically and with regard to security policy into the European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures. And here the argument goes that Germany as the country in the middle of Europe 
must have a special – and in Europe maybe the strongest – interest in a successful reform 
process in Russia and that it would not want to see Russia isolated and sidelined from the 
ongoing integration process in Europe and especially from the construction of an all-
European security architecture. In this sense, political elites and the population at large in 
Russia are less worried about a renaissance of nationalism or power awareness in Germany 
than some in the West. On the contrary: Moscow wants a strong united Germany and even 
demands that Bonn shoulders its growing responsibility and acts with determination as the 
influential country in the middle of Europe that it is. Russia would be alarmed if Germany 
became indifferent towards Russia or if it joined Western attempts at isolating Russia because 
of perceived renewed imperial ambitions. 
Of course Russian and German economic interests have their specific character. Therefore 
they are dealt with in detail in the chapter "Economic relations between Germany". 
                                                 
4 So Foreign Minister Kinkel, Chancen für Freiheit, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Rußland, in: Bulle-
tin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 14/1994, p. 125-127, here: p. 125. 
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1.3 Problematic Asymmetries 
In view of these complementary German-Russian interests relations between the two 
countries may appear to be rather uncomplicated, especially since both Kohl and Yeltsin 
repeatedly characterised the other's country as "the most important partner in Europe". This 
impression, however, has to be put into perspective: a number of drastic asymmetries between 
Germany and Russia with far-reaching political and psychological consequences are causing 
a great number of problems and frictions between the partners despite their common basic 
interests. The following paragraph lists the most important examples of such asymmetries – 
mostly unfavourable to Russia – with counterproductive influences: 
− Germany has achieved its unification as a state and taken the event as a reason to reject 
former great power traditions, to acknowledge its borders as final and to exclude all revisi-
onism (not the least with regard to Kaliningrad/Königsberg). The Soviet Union on the 
other side was dissolved but among Russian elites there still exists open or veiled revision-
ism regarding the CIS countries. Many do not consider today's Russian Federation as the 
final Russia. Such conceptions could become a considerable burden for the future of Ger-
man-Russian relations and all-European processes.  
− Germany emerged from the radical changes in Eastern Europe as a "winner" with 
increased international weight. But even after unification, Germany remains firmly 
integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures and uses its growing influence for the benefit of 
the integration processes and their enlargement towards the east. Russia, on the other side, 
is left without allies having lost its superpower status and now tries to at least maintain 
itself as a great power in Europe by exerting hegemony over the CIS countries and 
securing its influence in Eastern and Central Europe. If Russia tries to achieve this by 
using pressure, revisionist claims or by supporting dictatorial regimes (Belarus) the 
European co-operation could be considerably disturbed. When Chancellor Kohl visited 
Kiev in September 1996 he meant to "confirm our German commitment to and interest in a 
stable and independent Ukraine" thus giving a clear signal to Moscow. Because, as he said, 
"the Ukraine's stability is also part of Europe's stability".5  
− For Germany, international influence results not so much from military power but from 
economic strength, technological innovation, a society's internal stability and dynamism. 
In Russia, by contrast, the concept of power among large parts of the elites continues to be 
based on mainly militarily defined categories like "zones of influence", "correlation of 
forces", "geopolitical dimensions". This creates difficulties when discussing principles of 
Europe's restructuring. 
− Germany has learned lessons from faulty developments in its history and turned its back to 
former imperial aspirations in order to build friendly relations with all of its neighbours. 
One important confidence building measure was to unambiguously condemn the Nazi 
regime's crimes against the victim states. In Russia, however, the public debate aimed at 
coming to terms with the history of the Soviet regime has practically ceased and is 
increasingly being replaced by positions emphasising continuity with czarism and the 
                                                 
5 Radio Ukraine, Sept. 1996. 
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Soviet system. Such interpretation of history is detrimental to Russia's relations with its 
neighbours and hampers European integration. 
These asymmetric starting points are the main sources for current and potential differences 
and conflicts in the relationship between Germany and Russia as they appear mainly with 
regard to the CIS-countries' independence, to the states of Eastern and Central states and their 
security political classification and to the co-operative all-European security structures with 
the inclusion of Russia.6 Together with its allies, Germany is determined to act as a critical 
partner whenever Russia takes up politically unacceptable positions. When for example 
Moscow claims to be entitled on principle to special relations with the CIS states, when it 
actually denies Eastern and Central Europeans the free choice of their alliance partners or 
opposes the OECE as the highest security authority, then Bonn reacts to speak up to Moscow. 
At the same time, Germany considers itself more than any other state in Europe as Russia's 
partner trying to assist as much as it can the country's internal consolidation as well as its 
integration into multilateral institutions and the global economic division of labour. In the 
German view bilateral relations thus function as additional and stabilising elements of all-
European co-operation. This Germany can do only because it is firmly anchored in the West 
politically, economically and culturally. Russian politicians and publicists, however, seem not 
to appreciate this fact sufficiently. Russian political circles do not recognise the full 
significance of European integration and wrongly take Germany as a synonym for "Europe" 
instead of seeing what it really is: an important but firmly entrenched part of it. 
1.4 The Multilateral Level 
In view of the above mentioned asymmetries unfavourable to Russia the reunited Germany is 
the first to take responsibility for integrating Russia into international co-operation. And in-
deed, Bonn takes up this task with force. But Germany does not act as arbiter and neutral me-
diator between Russia and the West. Such a role was refused by Kohl during his Baden-
Baden conversations with Yeltsin in April 1997, and rightly so since this would risk isolating 
Germany in the West.7 Bonn prefers to see itself as Moscow's advocate offering its good 
services and tries from within to convince Western authorities to show sensitivity with regard 
to reasonable ideas from the Russian side. This strategy means a clear backing away from the 
thesis of a "hasty partnership" (Brezhinski) and underlines the intention to actively influence 
from the beginning developments in Russia through institutional integration instead of 
watching further developments from the sideline. 
Germany, for example, appealed energetically to fully include Russia into the consultations 
during the G7 world economic summits which have by now evolved from mainly economic to 
comprehensive politico-strategic summits. At the Denver summit in June 1997 Russia was in-
deed included except during discussions on currency and finances. In this way, Germany does 
justice to Russia's self-understanding as a great power and also to Moscow's endeavours to 
join the leading industrial powers that shape global politics to a very large degree and control 
                                                 
6 See H. Vogel (ed.), Rußland als Partner der europäischen Politik, in: Berichte des Bundesinstituts, 8/1996. 
7 FAZ, 18.4.1997. 
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the most important international economic and financial institutions. So it was only logical 
that Bonn welcomed the IMF's allocation of a three year credit of 10.2 billion USD in 
February 1996. As a main donor country Bonn strongly influenced the rescheduling of 
Russian liabilities vis-à-vis the London club of private creditors in November 1995 and the 
Paris Club of public creditors in April 1996. After all, the German part of Russian debts with 
the Club of Paris amounts to 40 percent or about 40 billion dollar. All in all, Germany is 
Russia's biggest creditor with 63 to 65 billion DM or 40-45 percent of all Russian foreign 
debts. 
Another example for Germany's active role as Russia's advocate are the negotiations about a 
NATO treaty with Russia which is aimed not least at flanking the envisaged admission of 
Eastern and Central European states to NATO by a comprehensive security partnership with 
Moscow. And indeed, Bonn had supported quite early the idea of establishing a joint panel 
which was then constituted at the Paris Basic Act in May 1997 as the "NATO-Russia 
Council" engaging in politico-military decisions and consultations. At the same time, Bonn 
tried to make sure that Russia's relations with Germany and the West were not restricted to 
NATO questions alone but put into the broad context of partnership and co-operation within 
the framework of OECE, EU and European Council. For the future of German-Russian 
relations much will depend on what happens after the Madrid NATO summit of July 1997 
and its membership offer to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, namely whether or not 
the mechanism of consultations and co-operation provided for in the Basic Act can develop a 
positive dynamism so that Russia feels to be an accepted partner in the new European security 
order. This is not at all a matter of course. In Madrid, it had been Germany together with the 
Nordic alliance members which backed successfully the proposal to positively mention the 
three membership candidates of the Baltic region in the final communiqué and to place on 
record that they belong among the candidates for a second NATO enlargement together with 
Romania and Slovenia.8 The Russian leadership on its part made clear that such a step would 
lead to the termination of the Moscow Basic Act. 
And finally, Germany pushed the pace during the preparation of the Treaty on Partnership 
and Co-operation between the EU and Russia which is likely to become valid in 1997. It 
worked especially hard to further open the market for Russian products as well as a future 
free trade zone among the treaty partners.9 With regard to political dialogue, economic 
interdependence and culture, the treaty offers Russia the opportunity to create a network of 
close connections with the EU. And due to the evolutionary terms and provisions of the treaty 
Russia is allowed to come very close to formal membership. In any case, the EU offers Russia 
today and probably also in future the most promising partnership for its development and 
transformation which at the same time helps to avoid isolating the country and excluding it 
from the pan-European integration processes. Already today, Russia concludes about 46 
percent of its foreign trade with the EU, and almost 50 percent of all direct investment in 
                                                 
8 The final communiqué in: Bulletin ..., 64/1997, p. 765-770, here: p. 766. 
9 For details see my contribution: Die Europäische Union und Rußland – Dimensionen und Perspektiven der 
Partnerschaft, in: integration (Bonn), 4/1996, p. 195-207. 
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Russia come from countries of the EU. Germany accounts here for 17 and 8 percent 
respectively. And there are good prospects for Russia to reach the status of an associate 
member of the EU, as Chancellor Kohl stressed in his Berlin meeting with Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin in July 1997. (Currently, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe among 
others enjoy such a status.) Under the condition, Kohl had added, that Russia improves the 
climate for investment.10 
As could be shown here, the strategy of integrating Russia internationally was shaped with 
substantial German contribution and achieved considerable success. If the Basic Act between 
NATO and Russia as well as the Partnership Treaty between the EU and Russia develop dy-
namically, then Gorbachev's earlier vision of a multidimensional "European house" could be-
come reality. Germany as the country in the middle of Europe would profit the most from 
such a development, just as it would suffer the most if this integration strategy failed. 
However, one should not overlook that there are certain limits to Russia's readiness to be 
integrated: a large majority of the Russian elites believes that it contradicts Moscow's 
interests to form all too close relations with the West in the sense of growing interdependence 
because in Russian view this would invariably lead to political dependence from the West and 
foreign swamping of Russian culture. The "ideological" priority given to integration into the 
"community of civilised states" of the West as Yeltsin had demanded is being replaced since 
1993 by a more pragmatic strategy of diversification of Moscow's international relations "tous 
azimuts". Among Russia's elites a basic consensus has been reached that the country must be 
"neither enemy nor ally" of the West (Foreign Minister Primakov). Instead Russia's aim 
should be to distinguish itself as a self-confident great power with specific interests and 
natural zones of influence, to build its own centre of focus and to integrate itself its own near 
environment. 
1.5 The Bilateral Level 
While in the past, bilateral relations between Germany and Russia possessed their own weight 
they are today completely overshadowed by international developments. This can be seen 
clearly in the final communiqués of politicians. Still, well functioning bilateral relations are of 
great significance as sort of a lining of the all-European processes. 
The punctual withdrawal of the last contingent of the "western group of troops" from 
Germany in August 1994 gave a positive impetus to bilateral relations. The withdrawal was 
an astonishing technical and organisational performance supported by Germany's financial 
assistance to civil programmes for military personnel: a housing programme for 45,300 
apartments (including social infrastructures as schools, kindergartens and hospitals) at the 
cost of 8.35 billion DM as well as several training and retraining programmes of 200 million 
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DM.11 Not the least against this background, regular consultations between the leaderships of 
both states have become political normalcy. 
On the other hand, promises and contractual agreements concerning the liquidation of other 
war derelicts could not be kept leading to repeated irritations and emotional upheavals in the 
German-Russian relationship. Examples are 1. Moscow's weak commitment to the re-estab-
lishment of the promised statehood for ethnic Germans in Russia. It appears that a large part 
of Germans in Russia and other CIS countries will emigrate to their original home country 
which is seen as a negative factor by both sides. During the recent years, the average number 
of emigrants amounted to about 200,000 per year. 2. The decision made in February 1997 by 
both branches of the Russian parliament to nationalise German cultural treasures shipped to 
Russia during the war and which Moscow had promised by agreement to return back. Since 
this problem strains the feelings of both sides to a high degree and will most probably do so 
also in future we shall explain it here in some detail.12 
According to German sources the so-called "looted art" comprises about 200,000 works of 
art, 2 million books and 3 kilometre of archive material. Its return was explicitly agreed upon 
in the German-Soviet treaty of November 1990 and in the Cultural Agreement of December 
1992. Both sides believed at the time that such a return would be possible in analogy to the 
treaty between the USSR and the GDR. After all, in the late 50ies Moscow had given back to 
East Berlin more than half of all museum treasures carried off from Germany. However, 
negotiations of the joint commission got stuck quickly when the national-communist anti-
Yeltsin opposition's infighting was being instrumentalized. It was pointed out how many 
national treasures were lost after Nazi-Germany's attack against the Soviet Union. Then the 
legal situation under international law was given a one-sided interpretation by ignoring the 
1907 land warfare order of Den Haag. Bilateral agreements with Germany were given a 
similar interpretation by claiming that the unconditional surrender of 1945 included a 
renunciation of all claims vis-à-vis Moscow. As a consequence, in Russian politics and public 
opinion an increasing number of people vehemently opposed the return of those cultural 
treasures. They are not so much concerned with the "looted art" as such. Their hawkish stance 
resulted – similar to the one with regard to NATO enlargement – from an increasingly strong 
feeling that Russia was being exploited, tricked and isolated by the West and had the right to 
defend its own interests with all means. The Federal Government on the other side points at 
the unambiguous legal situation: treaty agreements have to be honoured and can not be 
subverted through internal Russian legislation which is irrelevant under international law. In 
this sense, Foreign Minister Kinkel appealed in March 1994 to the democratic Russia to 
honour the rule of law and called the solution of this conflict as an "acid test for the quality of 
our relations". 
                                                 
11 The Programme and the problems of ist realisation are described in more detail in Part 2.3.3. ("Para-Eco-
nomic Relations") of this report.  
12 See E. Gujer, Moskau und die harte Haltung zur Beutekunst, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.3.1997. 
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For the time being a solution for the conflict about cultural treasures is not in sight. In their 
second vote of spring 1997, both chambers of the Russian parliament, the State Duma (the 
delegates of the lower house) and the Federation Council (representatives of the regions) 
overruled Yeltsin's veto with a large majority. The president had no alternative but to refer the 
law to the Constitutional Court because of defects regarding form or/and content. The 
outcome of this inner-Russian struggle is thus wide open. The political and emotional climate 
between Russia and Germany could very well become more and more poisoned with the 
result that compromises become ever more difficult to reach. 
Compromises are in fact very well conceivable. To name a few possibilities: 1. Assistance for 
the rebuilding and restoration of Russian monuments of art, churches and monasteries. Bonn 
has already given 20 million DM for the modernisation of Russian libraries as a gesture of 
good will. 2. German compensation for Russian art treasures destroyed or carried off during 
the war by offering similar or equally valuable works of art, possibly also a peaceful 
distribution of the "looted art". 3. An intensified search for stolen Russian treasures in the 
West. A good example for such a successful activity is the recent reappearance in Germany of 
parts of the famous amber chamber of Catherine's palace in Zarskoje Selo near St. Petersburg. 
But of course, if the Russian side wants to support its claims it would have to increase its 
effort to establish lists of catalogues and inventories of its stolen cultural treasures. In all the 
turmoil about the return of the "looted art" the Minister of Culture, Sidorov, remarked 
laconically: "We don't have something like this."13 
Germany has on principle every reason to hold on to its position of international law agreed 
upon with the Soviet Union and Russia and which has not been questioned by the Yeltsin ad-
ministration. During his visit to Germany in July 1997 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
expressed himself explicitly in favour of a "civilised solution" by which he meant the return 
of the cultural treasures of all sides to their "place of origin". And he includes German 
support for the return of Russian national treasures. At the same time, the special dimension 
of the war against the Soviet Union demands sensitivity when dealing with the restitution 
problems. Bonn must not be guided by legal arguments alone. After all, Venture Barbarossa 
was not a conventional war campaign but a war of enslavement and annihilation with flagrant 
violation of international laws. 
Frustrating experiences in bilateral relations "from above", however, are balanced by many 
promising activities "from below" like spontaneous and numerous meetings between people 
from both countries, close co-operation between political, social and cultural institutions, 
groups and associations. Particularly important are the by now 70 city partnerships which are 
mostly not limited to representative diplomacy of visiting city heads but come to life through 
practical co-operation of small and medium size enterprises, communal administrations, fi-
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nance management etc.14 The two-day conference on the subject organised by the "German-
Russian Forum" in June 1997 in Berlin had the motto: "City partnership as catalysator of en-
compassing reform processes". The conference attracted about 160 participants from munici-
palities in Germany and Russia. This strong interest from both sides shows how promising 
prospects on this level of bilateral relations are. 
The same is true for direct contacts between the regions of both states, like those between 
Lower Saxony and the Russian republic Tatarstan, between Brandenburg and the Moscow re-
gion or North Rhine-Westfalia and Nishniy-Novgorod. All in all, about 15 subjects of the 
Russian Federation have concluded co-operation agreements with 14 federal states of Ger-
many. Other indications of increasingly close relations on this level are visits of regional 
leaders in the Federal Republic who want to find out possibilities for decentralised economic 
co-operation, like Lushkov, mayor of Moscow, Yakovlev, mayor of St. Petersburg, Rossel, 
governor of the region Sverdlovsk, and Shabunin, governor of the region Volgograd. Both 
sides are convinced that during the ongoing transition to market economy the reforms of 
economic structures and foreign trade relations will profit more from individual regions 
creating their own profile than from the centre in Moscow which has lost many of its former 
planing and control powers. The visit of Stroyev, chairman of the Federation Council, to 
Germany in March 1997 together with a delegation of governors from different Russian 
regions must be seen in this context. The co-operation between the regions of both countries 
contain "inexhaustible opportunities" for Russia and Germany, the speaker of the 
parliamentary representative organ of the regions emphasised. In any case, he said, the 
interest in such a co-operation was "enormous" on both sides.15 
And indeed, the main focus of bilateral relations between Germany and Russia rests on eco-
nomic co-operation. Here, as with political relations, the outcome so far is quite a mixed one. 
Because of the great importance of the economic factor the specific developments, structures 
and problems concerning this area are described and discussed in the following chapter of this 
report. 
2. Economic Relations between Germany and Russia 
2.1 The Political Context 
The old structures of German-Russian economic relations as they existed in the 70ies and 
80ies have broken down in the East European revolution of 1989-1991. It was therefore 
necessary to rebuild completely anew the bilateral economic relations between Germany and 
Russia. This process is by far not yet completed. The German government has repeatedly 
                                                 
14 See Norbert Burger's contribution, Deutsch-Russische Städtepartnerschaften: Tragendes Element regionaler 
Zusammenarbeit, in: Deutsch-Russisches Forum – Jahresberichte für 1995/6, Bonn 1996, p. 53-60. The may-
or of Cologne speaks mainly about practical aspects of the well-functioning city-partnership Köln-Wolgo-
grad. 
15 Itar-TASS, 14.3.1997. 
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pointed out that Germany is greatly interested in a successful political and economic 
transformation in Russia and that it is well aware of the fact that "Russia is faced with a huge 
task" (G. Rexrodt, Minister of Economic Affairs). Germany, Rexrodt also said, "will support 
Russia to the best of its ability". A quotation of State Secretary Lammert shows how the 
Federal government evaluates the economic relations between Germany and Russia: 
"Germany and Russia are main trade and co-operation partners for each other. The 
development of bilateral economic relations is at the same time a test case for Russia's 
integration into the European and global economic co-operation." 
The German government has continuously made efforts to help Russia and give strong 
impetus to the bilateral economic relations, such as with Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in 
February 1996 where a German credit over four billion DM was agreed upon. The 
relationship with Russia ranks high on Germany's foreign policy agenda. That is why great 
endeavours are undertaken to carefully arrange contacts on all levels of interaction even when 
travelling. Official visits to Russia are prepared in detail by experts of the ministries 
concerned, institutions of East European and Russian studies, leading groups of the German 
industry and top business companies. If needed special reports are commissioned. 
Furthermore, when high ranking German politicians travel to Russia they are usually 
accompanied by representatives of selected enterprises. Journalists who come along are 
supposed to create a friendly, supportive climate in the Federal Republic with regard to 
Russia. 
Because of the increasing international interdependence a positive influence of German 
policies on the country's economic relations with Russia demands political co-ordination 
among Western countries engaged in business with Russia. Reality shows, however, that 
national interests, not to say egoism, come the fore. This "zero-sum game" mentality 
aggravates an already difficult situation in Russia so that even what is possible in principle 
cannot be reached. Despite all ritual incantation of Western common ideals and principles, 
separate actions begin already with information which is not given in the attempt to keep 
one's "national cards" covered. This behaviour continues with co-ordinating activities in 
practice. 
2.2 German and Russian Interests in Bilateral Economic Relations 
Germany's interest in economic co-operation with the Russian Federation is based on political 
as well as economic grounds. Concerning the political motives there are mainly four areas of 
concern: 
− the interest in seeing the political and economic transformation in Russia continue with a 
maximum of stability and predictability; 
− the interest in fulfilling exactly all economic commitments of the unification treaty in order 
to recommend oneself as a reliable co-operation partner; 
− the interest in creating acceptable living conditions for about two million ethnic Germans 
in Russia; 
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− the interest in connecting the Russian economy with the evolving European economic area 
in order to support Russia's integration into a new all European security architecture by 
foreign trade measures. 
As far as German economic motives are concerned, there are also four areas of interest: 
− the interest in a prompt and long-lasting opening of the Russian market for the wide range 
of German products; 
− in particular the interest in cushioning the effects of systemic and structural changes in 
East Germany by business with Russia; 
− the interest in securing supplies of raw materials and energy from Russia for the German 
economy; 
− the interest in Russia as a cost-saving production site and a bridge-head for opening up the 
markets of the CIS countries. 
Russia's interests in bilateral economic co-operation are motivated also both politically and 
economically. Often they are almost mirror-reflections of the German interests if not simply 
the same. However, some of the motives which are of primarily political nature on the 
German side, are economical in essence for Russia. 
Looking at the political motives for intensive economic relations with Germany, there is first 
of all Russia's interest in obtaining German support for the country's integration into the 
global economy and the leading international financial and economic organisations in order to 
upgrade Russia's political standing. 
Mostly economically motivated are 
− the interest in a rapid fulfilment of Germany's economic commitments of the unification 
treaty; 
− the interest in mobilisation of German financial aid for ethnic Germans in Russia; 
− the interest in far-reaching financial and technical assistance from Germany for economic 
transformation and in an active German role in mobilizing international aid; 
− the interest in selling bigger quantities of energy and raw materials to the Federal Republic 
in order to earn foreign currency to pay for Russian imports and debts.16 
Due to this constellation of interests, an intense political and economic dialogue on several in-
stitutional levels has developed. However, mainly due to the difficult situation in Russia, Ger-
man-Russian economic relations have not yet developed according to the expectations on 
both sides. This applies for all key areas of German-Russian economic relations: trade, eco-
nomic co-operation (joint ventures, direct investment), technical aid and consulting, financial 
co-operation and para-economic relations. 
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2.3 Main Elements of Economic Relations 
2.3.1 Trade 
The volume of German trade with Russia/USSR reached its highest level so far in 1990. With 
the collapse of the USSR, the subsequent constitution of new states on the territory of the for-
mer Soviet Union and the change of the political and economic system, the trade volume 
started to slide. Only in 1994, trade with Russia began to grow again by 9% to about 24 
billion DM. Compared with the previous year, imports rose by 23% from 10.7 billion to 13.2 
billion DM while exports dropped by almost 6% to about 10.8 billion DM. For the first time 
since 1990, the flow in commodities closed in 1995 with a considerable German trade deficit 
of about 2.4 billion DM. The previous trade upswing did not continue in 1995 but turned to a 
marginal decline of 0.2% down to 23.9 billion DM which practically meant stagnation. 
When comparing the overall trade volume with Eastern countries, Russia has fallen back to 
second place behind Poland. Concerning German exports to Eastern Europe, Russia took only 
place three after the Czech Republic all the while the German trade deficit with Russia rose 
from 2.4 billion DM in 1994 to 3.3 billion DM in 1995. In 1996 German exports rose by 11% 
to 11.5 billion DM. But at the same time, imports from Russia increased by substantially 
larger amounts, namely by 13% to 15.4 billion DM. Consequently, the trade deficit reached a 
new peak with 3.9 billion DM. Due to a 12% increase in trade reaching 26.9 billion DM 
Russia improved its proportional share of German foreign exchange, namely from 2% to 
2.3% in imports and from 1.4% to 1.5% in exports which means rank 12 and 15 among 
Germany's importing and exporting partner countries.17 
Concerning the structure of German exports to Russia, they mainly consist of products of the 
investment goods industries (52%) amounting to 5.9 billion DM. Considerable gains were 
registered for electro-technical products (plus 15% to 1.7 billion DM) and road vehicles (plus 
27% to 0.9 billion DM). In contrast, a downward trend was observed with steel construction 
products and rail vehicles (minus 43% to 0.3 billion DM) and machine building products 
(minus 6.3% to 2.2 billion DM). Compared to the previous year, foods and edible products 
rose by 23% to 2.1 billion DM and accounted for 18% of German exports to Russia. Another 
14% or 1.6 billion DM belong to primary and production goods. Deliveries of chemical prod-
ucts rose considerably by 36% reaching 1.2 billion DM, while iron and steel products fell by 
the same percentage down to 0.1 billion DM. Another 14% of the exports were consumer 
goods, compared to 1995 a 25% increase up to 1.6 billion DM. 
In 1996, petrol and natural gas played an ever more important role with regard to imports 
from Russia. Compared to the previous year, they increased their share of total imports from 
55% to now 66%. The value of these deliveries rose by 37% to 10.1 billion DM. On the other 
hand, imports of primary and production goods fell by 20% to 4.1 billion DM. This reduced 
their share from 38% to 27%. Especially orders for non-ferrous and semi-fabricated metals 
were reduced (minus 28% to 2.1 billion DM) while Russian export of mineral oil products 
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rose by 59% to 0.6 billion DM. In 1996, imports of consumer goods comprised only moderate 
quantities (minus 7.3% to 0.3 billion DM) while goods of Russian agriculture and forestries 
registered strong gains rising by 80% to 0.3 billion DM.  
When looking at the special strategic importance of German exports and imports, it can be 
seen that German exports to Russia even in the above mentioned main sectors such as ma-
chines are of only very limited significance, also in view of the fact that Russia as a whole is 
not a very important market for German goods. It is the individual companies and their 
regions of origin – the machine building industry in Nordrhein-Westfalen for example – that 
have a relatively high share of exports to Russia and are therefore greatly interested in stable 
business relations due to reasons of profit and employment. On the import side the large 
amounts of natural gas and oil Germany gets from Russia are of particular strategic 
importance. Already the old Federal Republic was interested in diversifying its sources of 
energy in order to be not too dependent on especially Middle East imports. Such endeavours 
to diversify further exist. Now they are generally accepted, but in the beginning 80ies they 
had to overcome in particular US-interventions ("natural gas-pipeline-deal"). 
All in all, it is true that the complementary character of the German-Russian trade relations 
has rather a slow-down effect on trade dynamism. Of course, there are the positive traditions 
of bilateral economic relations and the fact that Russia does too little foreign trade compared 
to its size and has therefore great trade reserves. All of this means that there exists a great 
potential for expanding business with Russia. It is to be expected, however, that the room to 
manoeuver can be used only when Russia succeeds in bringing about a sustained structural 
change of economy making a substitutive inter-industrial trade possible. 
2.3.2 Direct Investment and Joint Ventures 
For German foreign investors, Russia as an investment site plays on the whole only a minor 
role. Larger direct investments continue to be obstructed by insufficient political, legal, finan-
cial and economic conditions. German-Russian negotiations on agreements with regard to an 
appropriate investment-framework are proceeding slowly. A new double taxation agreement 
for example could only be signed after tough negotiations on 29 May 1996 and came into 
force on 30 December 1996. 
Concerning volume and dynamics, the political and economic turbulences after the collapse 
of the USSR caused German direct investments in Russia which have never been very high to 
drop down to 8 million DM in 1992. In the following year, they reached with 29 million DM 
almost the level of 1990 (33 million DM) and rose to 138 million DM till the end of 1994. In 
1995, however, another decline was registered. All these data are quoted from the German 
Federal Bank which bases its calculations on very strict delimiting criteria. It is therefore 
quite possible that data given by GOSKOMSTAT are more realistic which claim that German 
companies invested 293 million USD in 1995 alone and therefore rank on third position after 
the USA and Great Britain within the overall Western investment in Russia of 2.8 billion 
USD.  
Rußland und Deutschland in Europa 21 
The USA tops by a large margin (1.66 billion USD) the ranking list of foreign investors in 
Russia compiled by Goskomstat for 1996. Then follows Switzerland (1.32 billion USD), the 
Netherlands (978 million USD), Great Britain (486 million USD) and Germany (289 million 
USD). The weak position of Germany when compared with other countries has its reason in 
statistics. Goskomstat includes all capital investment like trade credits and bank deposits in its 
calculations. This "sort of investment" accounts for the main part of commitments made by 
those countries ranging before Germany. However, if we define a foreign investment as direct 
productive long term capital investment then Germany is topped only by the USA because it 
invests in Russia more than Switzerland, the Netherlands and Great Britain added together.18  
German investment concentrates predominantly on the city and oblast of Moscow which re-
ceive 54% of all financial means alone. Since the most important motive of German direct in-
vestment is the opening of markets, the Federal Government encourages investment activities 
of German firms by concluding investment protection and promotion agreements, by granting 
capital investment guarantees against political risks, by offering low interest credits for 
medium sized companies through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) as well as with 
their own investment related activities through the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft 
(DEG). In accordance with the German-Russian agreement on the promotion and protection 
of investment of 5 August 1991 still in force, the German government has granted German 
investors in Russia till the end of 1995 capital investment guarantees amounting to about 260 
million DM. Applications for another 710 million DM have been made but have still to be 
examined. 
Figures for Russian investments in Germany given by German officials for the years 1992-
1995 are as follows: 1992: 9 million DM; 1993: 305 million DM; 1994: 21 million DM and 
1995: 149 million DM. It has to be pointed out here that quite a number of Russian firms are 
involved in the new federal states. Gasprom, for example, has a share of 35% in the joint 
venture Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus, Berlin, together with Wintershall, Kassel. 
Gasprom's share in the Leipziger Verbundnetz Gas AG is 5%. Beschresursy AG from 
Bashkortostan has bought Addinol Mineralöl GmbH in Lützkendorf. Vereinigte 
Zellstoffwerke Pirna have been bought by the Moscow Sokolniki AG with an investment 
commitment of 303 million DM for an overall modernisation of the firm. The Russian Oil-
Holding Rosneft has a 23% share in the conglomerate Mitteldeutsche Erdölraffinerie GmbH 
together with Elf Aquitaine S.A. Paris (43%) and Thyssen Handelsunion Düsseldorf (33%) to 
build a new oil refinery in Spergau (Leuna) costing 4.3 billion DM, of which 1.3 billion are 
state subsidies. 
Despite the fact that for some time being Western enterprises are showing increasing scepti-
cism concerning this form of foreign capital investment in Russia, the number of registered 
joint ventures rose by 10.6% in 1996 alone and numbers now 16,100.19 Most of them have 
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been established together with American, German, Chinese, Ukrainian, British and Finnish 
firms. The number of German-Russian joint ventures should now amount to over 1800 or al-
most 12%. This number may be quite impressive but it has to be put into perspective. Suppos-
edly up to two thirds of all joint ventures "founded" have not gone beyond the registration 
formalities. In addition, it is well known that "bridgeheads", "observer posts" and quite a 
number of sham joint ventures were created in order to be able to participate in international 
assistance programmes, and which can be activated or closed as required. Therefore, the 
capital investment in these joint ventures is rather small (less than 75,000 USD in 75% of all 
joint ventures founded). German partner enterprises are pursuing first of all sales oriented 
objectives. Apart from that they look for opportunities to purchase and procure goods. A third 
group of motives are related to regional activities since it is important to be present in all 
major regional markets. Considerations concerning low labour costs have up to now played a 
lesser role. Recently, German enterprises show the tendency to set up subsidiary companies 
(Tochtergesellschaften) rather than to participate in joint ventures.20 
2.3.3 Para-economic relations 
Among various para-economic relations, the German CIS housing programme for military 
personal is the most prominent example. Vis à vis the USSR already, the German government 
had committed itself to finance a housing programme with a total volume of 7.8 billion DM 
for the 516,200 soldiers and civil personnel of the former Soviet Union who were to leave the 
new federal states (Überleitungsvertrag of 9 October 1990). In December 1992, this sum was 
increased by another 550 million DM to altogether 8.35 billion DM. On 6 October 1996, the 
successful completion of the programme was announced with the opening of the last 1,037 
apartments in the new housing estate Nachabino near Moscow.21 800 buildings with 45,300 
apartments at 39 building sites have been constructed of which 28 are located in the Russian 
Federation, seven in Belarus and four in the Ukraine. The programme included not only the 
buildings but the complete infrastructure as well. 40 schools with 1,120 full equipped class 
rooms were built, 60 kindergartens for more than 15,000 children, 33 hospitals and policlinics 
including the whole medical equipment, 30 trade and shopping centres, 36 heating plants plus 
32 water treatment and garbage disposal plants. Also two house building combines and 10 
production plants for housing materials were set up.22 
The housing programme was the biggest single item within the broad range of financial assis-
tance projects undertaken in connection with the Soviet/Russian troops withdrawal from the 
former GDR amounting to an overall sum of 16.05 billion DM. 
The programme contributed essentially to the early withdrawal of Russian troops from Ger-
many and was as such a success. However, the German enterprises taking part in this pro-
gramme saw their expectations fulfilled only partially. It had been agreed upon that only 1.2 
                                                 
20 Handelsblatt (H), 30./31.8.1996. 
21 Der Tagesspiegel, 10.10.1996. 
22 BMWi-Tagesnachrichten, 10516, 10.10.1996. 
Rußland und Deutschland in Europa 23 
billion DM worth of orders went to German companies exclusively while international 
tenders were called for the larger part of the programme. Thus, many orders went to cheap 
suppliers from Turkey, Finland, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Furthermore, the high Russian 
inflation rate made building materials ever more costly to the point where German 
construction firms were not able to make profits any more. Almost all of them failed to 
establish themselves in the Russian house-building sector with the prospect of obtaining other 
large orders in the future. 
2.4  Instruments and Strategies to Promote Trade and Economic Co-operation 
2.4.1 Government Treaties and Institutions 
Since the Russian Federation was internationally recognized as the legal successor to the 
USSR, the Russian government considered the framework of treaties concerning the 
economic relations with the "new" Federal Republic of Germany which were concluded 
during the Gorbachev era as legally binding. In this context, the German side emphasized first 
of all the investment protection treaty of 1989, the economic aspects of the international 
unification treaty (2 plus 4-Vertrag) and the bilateral "Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, 
Partnership and Co-operation", both of 1990. On the other side, the Federal Government had 
to recognize a great number of still to be realized co-operation treaties between the former 
GDR and the USSR as the basis for future bilateral economic relations. However, the 
necessary institutional and treaty guidelines for German-Russian interactions were still not 
yet sufficiently defined. 
In the "Joint Declaration" of 21 November 1991, Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin 
agreed to completely revise the existing institutional mechanism of economic co-operation. 
Both sides came to the understanding that a new German-Russian Co-operation Council 
should be established as a new institution for promoting trade and economic co-operation. 
This council met on 18 February 1992 for its constituent assembly and was suppose to meet 
every half year alternatively in one of the economically important cities of both countries The 
tasks given to this institution can be summed up as follows: 
− improving the legal guidelines for economic co-operation; 
− officially supporting the business companies in making contacts with new institutions and 
officials in Russia; 
− expanding and building up economic relations by promoting direct contacts between enter-
prises in both states; 
− maintaining traditional business relations between companies of the new federal states and 
the Russian Federation by giving assistance to their restructuring; 
− pushing on-going treaty negotiations on co-operation projects in individual economic 
spheres. 
The council formed working groups for the following main sectors of future bilateral 
economic co-operation: 
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− consultations on questions of market economy; 
− oil and natural gas; 
− textiles and clothing; 
− agriculture and food processing industries; 
− chemistry and pharmacy; 
− arms conversion; 
− trade. 
These groups were later enlarged, for example the team working on arms conversion now also 
covers machine building. Others were newly set up such as the groups working on questions 
of banking, infrastructure and telecommunication or aviation and space industries. 
In accordance with the present state of the Russian transformation, the Co-operation Council 
is at the moment still dominated by state influence. The weight of participants representing 
business companies who mostly work in the sectorial groups will probably increase in as 
much as the restructuring of the Russian economy will produce more and more private partner 
companies capable of co-operating with German firms. After its second meeting in September 
1992 in Moscow, the council was not called together regularly as it was supposed to be. There 
have been not more than six meetings altogether. The reasons are the continuing political and 
economic turbulences in Russia which limit the decision-makers' room to manoeuvre 
considerably. Therefore, the council's influence remains weak. It became clear that this state-
administrative type of German-Russian co-operation gives little momentum to the bilateral 
economic relations. Parallel developments and experiences made with Central European 
countries led to the conclusion to dissolve the co-operation councils there. In the course of 
rapid and successful market economic transformation in these countries, bilateral chambers of 
trade such as in Budapest, Prague, Warsaw were established to replace the former inefficient 
state-controlled co-operation mechanism.  
It will be some time to go before Moscow is ready for it. However, the sixth meeting of the 
German-Russian co-operation council taking place from 28 to 30 May in Yekaterinburg 
(Ural-Region) was a turning point in the development of this institution.23 For the first time, 
the agenda of this meeting focused on furthering trade and co-operation relations with the so-
called 89 Russian federation subjects which begin to play an ever more independent role in 
the country's foreign trade. There were two reasons why Yekaterinburg was chosen as 
location for the conference. Firstly, the city is centre of one of the most important industrial 
regions with branches of metallurgy and heavy industry. Secondly, the city is close to sources 
of all sorts of raw materials and offers many points of contact for German suppliers of plants 
and equipment, for industrial participation and the construction of modern industrial 
branches. Discussions with among others the governor of Yekaterinburg, E. Rossel, 
concentrate on the areas electric power industry, plants and equipment for primary industries, 
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mining technology, component production as well as the service sector. In a memorandum, 
essential aspects were explained to the Russian partners which have to be taken into 
consideration when it comes to using guarantees of regional corporations and banks for 
trading deals.24  
2.4.2 Institutions of the German Economy 
In this context the Ost-Ausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft has to be mentioned first. In order 
to adapt to the results of the radical changes in Russia, the Ost-Ausschuß was restructured. 
The working group Soviet Union was dissolved and replaced by among others a working 
group for the Russian Federation. Its main task consists of co-ordinating the interests and 
activities of the German business community with regard to its future economic relations with 
Russia, to help prepare and carry out bilateral business negotiations, maintain contacts to 
Russian partners and inform and advise commercial firms. A special working group was 
established dealing with questions of contractual arrangements and financing which is 
supposed to assembly high ranking representatives of banks and industries in a so-called 
"steering committee". The Ost-Ausschuß has set up a recording agency in the framework of 
the Berliner Kooperationsbüro der deutschen Wirtschaft, which has to record outstanding or 
soon to be payable, uncovered receivables of German firms from business deals with the 
former USSR which amount to almost 2 billion DM. 
In mid-February of 1992, the Zentrum für deutsch-russische Wirtschaftskooperation (ZDRW) 
was founded in Düsseldorf. This institution wants to provide restructuring aid and support for 
individual projects. Russian and German experts are members at par. 40-50% of all German 
exports to Russia come from the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) which therefore 
provides an initial financial assistance to the Center. The Russian counter-part to this center is 
the Center for Russian ministry of economic affairs, the Moscow city government and the 
Russian industrial association. The center mainly helps Russian firms to find business 
partners in Germany and to obtain commercial information and know-how. But also German 
companies can use the center to find Russian business partners. 
On 5 March 1997 the Deutsche Industrie- und Handelszentrum (DIHZ) was opened in Mos-
cow. It is a joint project of the DIHT and the Berliner Bank. Together with similar centres in 
Yokohama, Shanghai and Singapore it is globally the fourth such institution. Their task is to 
combine important institutions working locally for the promotion of foreign trade under one 
roof and to support German partners on the Russian market.25 Represented in the DIHZ are 
the Delegation der Deutschen Wirtschaft, the Bundesstelle für Außenhandelsinformation 
(BfAI), the Verband der Deutschen Wirtschaft in the Russian Federation, and economic 
representatives of the federal states of Baden-Würthemberg and Bayern, the Berliner Bank, 
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the Bayerische Landesbank as well as a number of other German enterprises.26 DIHZ offers 
services in practically all areas of trade such as opening up new business contacts, 
consultancy on distribution and sales strategies, market research, support for setting up new 
firms and choosing the right site, settling of payments, contacts to Russian associations and 
authorities, and so forth. In addition and equally under the direction of the Berliner 
Bank/Bankgesellschaft Berlin, the construction of a "Berliner Haus" is planned until the end 
of 1998 open first of all to smaller firms.  
2.4.3 Export Guarantees (Hermes) 
Among German trade policy endeavours, export credit sureties (Hermes) are playing a special 
role. For 1997 as for 1996, the Federal Government has set a credit ceiling of 1.5 billion DM. 
This financing limit which is being used better and better by the Russian side should be suffi-
cient to fulfil expectations the enterprises have with regard to exports. This limit also takes 
into consideration the Russian government's interest to honour its agreement on limiting 
foreign debts concluded with the IMF.27 The sureties are divided into two covering funds 
ceilings. The funds of ceiling I amounting to 600 million DM are open to small and medium 
sized companies which do not belong to trusts. The sum of reference for a single deal is 50 
million DM. The products have to come exclusively from the new federal states. In the case 
of capital goods a share of up to 30% may origin from the old federal states. The funds of 
ceiling II amounting to 900 million DM are open to enterprises both from the new and old 
federal states. The sum of reference for a single deal is 100 million DM. In principle, half of 
the products have to come from East Germany, but this rule can be by-passed if the producer 
is a small or medium sized firm and if the merchandise or part of it coming from the old 
federal states amount to no more than 20 million DM. 
Even though there is no doubt that it were the Hermes-sureties that made a great number of 
business deals with Russia possible, the results of a comprehensive assessment are sobering. 
In this context, four factors are especially noteworthy: 
− Firstly: the East German firms receiving preferential treatment suffer a steep decline in or-
ders. The concentration of Hermes-sureties on the new federal states was not confirmed by 
business developments and the German-Russian exchange in goods was not improved but 
rather obstructed. 
− Secondly: the export turnover of trade with Russia was clearly inferior to the volume of the 
Hermes-sureties. 
− Thirdly: another reason why Hermes-sureties are playing only a relatively minor role is the 
fact that Russian companies are often incapable of paying the 15% down payment on the 
merchandise and that it is difficult to obtain the necessary financial guarantees from the 
Russian state. 
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− Fourthly: because of these difficulties, German enterprises make a special effort to find 
Russian partners who are willing and capable of making advanced payments or agreeing to 
counter-trade business deals.28 
It would therefore be advisable to define different rules for East and West German companies 
with regard to the covering funds ceilings. In addition, conditions for obtaining Hermes-sure-
ties should be relieved and the areas covered by such sureties should be enlarged to include 
counter-trade and project financing. 
After signing the recent agreement with the Club of Paris, and not least because the German 
export enterprises insistently asked for it, the Federal Government has in May 1996 upgraded 
Russia from the Hermes-category five into four. This means that the fees for Hermes-sureties 
in business deals with Russia will be lowered by 25%. In addition, the German government 
accepts for the first time to a certain degree guarantees of Russian banks with a good interna-
tional standing. Since the beginning of this year, the Russian government shows a much 
greater willingness to provide the necessary guarantees for such business transactions. It is 
therefore to be expected that the overall ceiling for Russia in the year of 1996 will be fully ex-
hausted. 
2.4.4 Alternative Financial Instruments 
Since the Russian side still considers a Hermes-surety restrictive and costly and therefore 
difficult to obtain, German business circles started to look for alternative financial 
instruments which are supported also by the Federal Government. 
Firstly, there is the Rahmenkredit- und Handelsabkommen (RKHA). In 1993, an agreement 
between the Siboil Bank commissioned by the Tjumen district administration and the 
Deutsche Bank AG was concluded concerning a basic treaty and special accounts. In 
accordance with this agreement, exports from the new federal states to Tjumen are financed 
by credits covered by Hermes-sureties. These credits are transferred back with money earned 
by long-term orders or deliveries of oil, and go through a special account in Germany. The 
credit programme runs (or ran) under the name "Tjumen I" and has been completed in the 
meantime. The first of the credits paid out so far are already in the process of being paid back. 
Negotiations and structuring of the financial package were not always without problems. 
During the ongoing business relations for example, the framework for counter-trade and other 
clearance and approval regulations were changed on the Russian side. However, both sides 
continued to look for pragmatic solutions and were often able to find them. The Bundesanstalt 
für vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben, a successor organisation of the Deutsche 
Treuhand, which is responsible for part of the new federal states' activities in Russia has 
recently concluded seven such open-to-borrow and trade agreements following the Tjumen-
model with different regions of the Russian Federation (Tjumen, Perm, Swerdlowsk, 
Tsheljabinsk, Orenburg, Tatarstan, Komi). The overall volume of all orders amounts to 
between 6 and 7 billion DM. 
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Given Russia's financial weakness the export oriented German industry has adopted the prin-
ciple "finance by trade", i.e. finance by concluding trade-off deals. Different financial instru-
ments of increasing importance have thus come into being in this context even if they are not 
considered cheap. In the meantime, suppliers such as the Deutsche Clearing and Countertrade 
GmbH (DCCG, Duisburg), the Wemex Handel GmbH (Ludwigsfelde) and the Finance by 
Trade GmbH (Berlin) are on the market. Russia, like other countries lacking in foreign cur-
rencies, delivers goods to firms specializing in barter trade. In this way, currency deposits ac-
cumulate on trustee accounts in Germany which in turn are used by the supplier to buy prefer-
entially German merchandise. Here, too, the situation shows that there is still a long way to 
go until business with Russia is normalized. Still, counter-trade programmes can help create 
more possibilities for financing Russian imports. 
Other special forms of new financing are described by terms like "tolling agreement" (the fi-
nancing of job processing contracts), "preexport finance" (prefinancing of exports), structured 
trade financing with or without swing-credits. All these forms have in common that they are 
financing the flow of goods where granted credits are paid back with the sales proceeds of 
counter-purchases, the life of the loan is relatively short and the number of involved partners 
at least three but mostly more than three (German exporter, Russian exporter, trading 
company and bank).29 
2.4.5 Consulting and Technical Assistance 
"TRANSFORM", the German government's programme to provide consulting and technical 
assistance does not intend to convey a so-called "German way" toward the market economy. 
The Federal Government's objective is rather to support the general conditions necessary for 
building up a socially oriented market economy on the basis of a democratic constitution in 
Russia (and other countries in transition). Between 1994 and 1996, Russia has received 222.4 
million DM or 25% of the programme's overall financial volume of 885 million DM. Because 
of financial constraints in the federal budget the resources for TRANSFORM have been 
sharply reduced. Within the total sum of 46.7 million DM planned for Russia almost 17 
million DM (36%) are provided for central government consultancy and other projects above 
the regional level. About 30 million DM are to be spend for technical assistence within the 
Russian regions.30 
In accordance with Russian officials, the priorities of the programme have been specified in 
the following way: 
− advice for policies aimed at defining guidelines for the development of middle-class struc-
tures and midsize enterprises; 
− assistance in restructuring of companies, for privatisation and de-monopolisation; 
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− assistance in establishing a system of taxation, customs, insurance, banking, stock 
exchange; 
− consultations in the agricultural area; 
− education and training in economic law, assistance in building-up administrative 
structures; 
− consultations in the fields of labour markets and social insurance; 
− help to environmental protection. 
It was agreed upon with the Russian side that the programme should not only consist of meas-
ures for the central government but for important regions. Originally, four target regions were 
chosen: Moscow city and the Moscow district, St. Petersburg city and the Leningrad district, 
Tjumen district and Wladimir district, Tjumen has been abandoned in the meantime. 
To put the TRANSFORM programme into practice, the Federal Government uses the Kredit-
anstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) which has been and still is active also outside this pro-
gramme when it supports transformation countries with financial and organisational services 
(granting of long-term credits under the condition of respective Hermes-sureties; granting 
credits in the framework of a special programme for small and medium sized business firms; 
carrying out the housing programme for returning soldiers and retraining measures). 
Apart from the Federal Government, almost all Bundesländer (federal states) have their own 
sponsoring programmes for Russian regions they had mostly chosen already before the begin-
ning of the TRANSFORM programme. Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) is particularly active. 
Several ministries under the overall if not always successful control of the Staatskanzlei to-
gether with the Westdeutsche Landesbank carry out a broad range of consultancy measures in 
the districts of Nishnij-Nowgorod and Kostroma concerning the following areas: environ-
mental protection and agriculture (sewage and cleaning of the Volga); economic, 
technological and infrastructural development (promotion of industries, urban development, 
housing); education and professional training (among others supporting the technical 
university of Nishnij Nowgorod); health and social services; administration and public 
security (training programmes for the police). 
Further technical assistance projects are carried out by other federal institutions, the Länder, 
the German economy and the foundations of the great German political parties (Konrad-Ade-
nauer-Stiftung, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung etc.). 
3. Conclusions and Perspectives 
3.1 The Overall Scene  
In relations between Russia as the force field between Europe and Asia on the one side and 
Germany as a weighty integral part of the West on the other side there do not exist any self-
reinforcing tendencies – neither in direction of partnership nor towards new confrontation. 
The bilateral relationship has to be actively shaped on the basis of realistic expectations and 
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an accurate assessment of mutual interests. An important element could be the intensification 
of cultural relations which are by far not as lively as they should be between friendly nations 
– not the least because of financial reasons.31 But first of all, it would be necessary to keep 
alive the younger generation's interest for the partner country. After the example of analogous 
institutions with France and Poland, the planned German-Russian Youth Organisation with a 
decentralised structure could be a means to achieve this purpose. For it is not at all certain 
that young people especially in Germany give as much attention to relations with Russia as 
the older ones who feel strongly attached to this country, in the positive (German 
reunification) as well as the negative sense (Second World War and its after-effects). 
The Russian side would be well advised to continue further comprehensive transformation in 
order to improve conditions for German promotion as regards direct investment for example. 
Here, Russia must not overestimate Germany's ability to assist its reform processes materially 
since Germany will have to concentrate on the consequences of reunification for some time to 
come. In addition, Russians have to understand that Germany does not regard its relations to 
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as a function of its relations to Russia but accords 
them an importance in themselves. The chances for a successful German-Russian partnership 
and more "good services" offered by Bonn to help integrate Moscow internationally will im-
prove to the same degree as Russia accepts the free choice of its neighbouring countries and 
as those conceptions and groups in Russia gain in influence that give priority to economic 
factors over military projections in foreign affairs. There are signs that such conceptions are 
more and more being accepted within the government and opposition. To name a few: the 
group around the First Deputy Prime Ministers Chubays and Nemzov and the Deputy Head of 
the Security Council, Beresovskiy, or the liberal-democratic movement Yakoblo under 
Yavlinskiy. These groups of people concentrate on working for Russia's internal 
modernisation rather that seeking outward power projection. If they should determine Russian 
politics permanently then also in relations with Germany it will be to a large degree economic 
relations that define the quality of political relations. 
Germany on the other side has to see clearly that for some time to come Russia will not be 
able to find a general consensus on fundamental values and national identity. Russia has 
entered a phase of transition where different and even opposing positions exist side by side: 
old and new politico-cultural tendencies; elements of freedom and authoritarianism; 
beginnings of market economy and elements of state economic control; insistence on 
centralised power and struggle for regional autonomy; concepts of traditional great power 
posture and turning to pragmatic realpolitik with partnership and co-operation. In view of the 
open outcome of developments in Russia it is important not to consider negative aspects as 
the last word on the matter. One should always remember that the Russian society, too, is able 
to evolve internally and to live as partner in the international community of states. 
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To summarise the future of German-Russian relations in their multilateral aspects: there are 
problems and chances. Problems arise because Moscow is only insufficiently aware of the 
fact that European integration is a complex multilateral process based on voluntary 
renunciation of sovereignty and that Germany is fully integrated in this process. Only the 
future will show whether the German concept can be carried out successfully, namely 
whether both goals can be reached: integration of Eastern and Central Europe and partnership 
with Russia as the only means to avoid new rifts and new lines of conflict between Russia and 
Europe. To include Russia in the European processes and to acknowledge its outstanding role, 
however, demands of Moscow to shoulder more responsibility. Adventures like the war of 
annihilation in Chechnya or the support of Lukashenko's dictatorship in Belarus can only be 
counterproductive. 
The chances are good not least because of the fact that "national identity" is not subject to his-
toric determinism despite all historic lines of continuity. The formation of a national identity 
is as dynamic as the people themselves. This is true for Russia as it is for Germany which has 
dramatically changed its self-perception as well as its political culture within a few decades. 
Today it is without doubt that Russia is anchored in European traditions. This becomes appar-
ent in public rhetorics as well as in the consciousness of the citizens (70 percent of whom live 
on this side of the Urals). And so it is to be expected that Russia will also in future be truly in-
terested in giving priority to the European direction politically, economically and culturally 
which in turn will be the precondition for a close German-Russian partnership. And thus Ger-
many together with its allies will be encouraged to work actively towards integrating Russia 
into a greater Europe despite setbacks and crises. However, since possibilities to influence 
Russia are limited it would already be a success if Russia could at least be kept open for Euro-
pean values, principles and norms. 
3.2 The Specific Economic Scene  
Each analysis looking into the prospects of the German-Russian economic relations has to 
start with assessing its determining factors. On the Russian side, it would be important to 
improve the macro-economic stabilisation and to establish a framework of rules and 
regulations for domestic and foreign trade reassuring potential German investors, to guarantee 
sufficient compatibility of central and regional laws with regard to the economy and foreign 
trade as well as the necessary protection against criminal acts and arbitrary behaviour of 
authorities. 
Among the factors relating directly to foreign trade or the German-Russian economic 
relations, the following need to be emphasized: 
− political reliability in the sense that commitments undertaken by the Russian government 
will be fulfilled and not have to be re-negotiated as happened quite often in the recent past; 
− consistency of foreign trade policy as part of a general economic policy: the development 
of stable economic relations cannot be guaranteed if co-operation priorities agreed upon by 
both sides can be unilaterally changed by the Russian side due to internal conflicts within 
the government; 
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− higher efficiency and better co-ordination among all organisations on government and en-
terprise levels, which take part in the bilateral economic co-operation so that the Co-opera-
tion Council or its groups do not have to discuss the same topics at each of their meetings; 
− measures to stop capital flight from Russia; 
− establishment of an efficient system of export sureties; 
− guarantees for sufficiently stable exchange rates which would at the same time improve the 
Russian economy's export chances. 
Even if the factors on the Russian side are without doubt of a much greater significance for 
the future of German-Russian economic relations there are nevertheless a number of 
considerable contributions the German side could make in order to improve the situation. The 
following are of particular interest: 
− fixing state Hermes-sureties for exports for several years in advance in order to create a 
long-term stable framework of provisions for German exports to Russia and other CIS 
states; 
− broadening and strengthening of new financial models coming from the private sector such 
as the DCCG; 
− enlargement and co-ordination of consulting and technical assistance provided by the Fed-
eral government, the federal states and communes as well as the private economy in the 
sense of a communication network of use also for foreign trade; 
− on the political level: increased efforts on the part of the German government to integrate 
Russia into important institutions of the global economy such as the WTO. 
Depending on the constellation of all factors mentioned in this analysis so far, different 
scenarios could be imagined concerning the Russian foreign trade in general and the German-
Russian economic relations in particular.32 The benign scenario of a speedy and successful 
systemic transformation including a comprehensive modernisation of economic structures 
cannot be expected and therefore no quick upswing of economic relations as well. Also 
unlikely is the malign scenario of political and economic turbulences in Russia with the 
consequence of a sharp bilateral trade-decline. Most probable is an "in-between-scenario" 
with a stop-and-go approach toward transformation and a status-quo-implication for bilateral 
trade and co-operation. The consequence would read: German partners will indeed find 
opportunities for further economic engagement but many deals will include considerable 
uncertainties. Instruments and strategies of the German government will continue to play their 
role as stabilizing factors but considering the heavy burden of Russian realities their impact 
will be limited. Therefore, a well proven maxim will further be valid: who wants to do 
business in Russia must be prepared to run great risks, needs a talent for improvisation and 
should have a broad and actual knowledge of the socio-economic environment as well as 
reliable partners on the spot. 
                                                 
32 H.-H. Höhmann/C. Meier, La RFA à recherche de nouvelles relations avec la Russie, in: Le courrier des pays 
de l'Est, juillet-août 1995, p. 30. 
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Summary 
Introductory Remarks 
Relations between Germany and Russia constitute an important and indispensable element of 
European co-operation. Both Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin have on a number of oc-
casions described each other's country as their "most important partner in Europe." This is 
certainly true, albeit in different ways for each country. Whereas Germany is Russia's most 
important world-wide trading partner, Russia is essential for Germany (and indeed for the 
West as a whole) in the establishment of a new order in East Central Europe. Nevertheless, 
the relationship is also a troubled one that is burdened both by unresolved issues outstanding 
from World War II as well as by differing ideas about the new European security 
arrangements and by the unsatisfactory conditions for foreign economic activity in Russia. 
The present report examines the problems of and prospects for German-Russian relations in 
both their bi- and multilateral dimensions. It draws on original sources, scholarly literature 
and press materials from both countries. 
Findings 
1. In terms of intentions the interests of the two states both in their bilateral relationship and 
in a multilateral context generally concur. Germany's main concern is that Russia should 
attain the status of a partner in international organisations and in the international 
allocation of economic assignments and should play a constructive role befitting a major 
power in the establishment of a new European order. This concept conforms with the 
interests of Russia, which in addition cherishes the hope that Germany will become its 
chief partner in bringing about the development, transformation and modernisation of 
Russia. Nevertheless, a number of decisive asymmetries in the relationship have meant 
that in spite of their many common interests frictions repeatedly arise between the two 
countries. 
2. On the multilateral level Bonn has pushed hard for the international integration of Russia. 
Its role here, however, has not been one of referee or neutral intermediary between Russia 
and the West but rather that of Moscow's advocate, serving to elicit a sympathetic 
response within Western institutions to Russian causes that it considers to be justified. As 
examples of this the report cites the economic summit of the G-7 states and events 
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surrounding it, certain aspects of the debate over NATO's expansion eastwards as well as 
Germany's role in drafting the friendship and co-operation treaty between the EU and 
Russia. 
3. These days the bilateral relationship between Russia and Germany is entirely 
overshadowed by international developments. Nevertheless, it is still of great importance 
because it builds the foundation for European processes. All in all the relationship has 
been very mixed: while political relations were given a positive impetus not least by the 
punctual withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany in August 1994, 
attempts to resolve other outstanding disputes have been marked by failures to keep 
promises or adhere to agreements. This has resulted in repeated irritations and outbreaks 
of emotion on both sides. This applies in particularly to the issue of the "Russian 
Germans" and to the dispute over the so-called "pillaged art treasures," which the report 
examines in more detail. 
4. Frustrations in the relationship at the political level are, however, counterbalanced by a 
wealth of activity at the grassroots. This includes numerous contacts between people from 
the two countries and co-operation between political, social and cultural institutions, 
groups and associations. Particularly important are the twin city schemes, of which there 
are now seventy. Also noteworthy are the growing number of direct contacts between re-
gions of Germany and Russia. 
5. Following German reunification there were great hopes that German-Russian relations 
would undergo a dynamic development. The fact that this has failed to happen has a lot 
more to do with Russia than with Germany, although the restructuring problems encoun-
tered by the east German economy in making the transfer to the market have no doubt had 
a negative impact as well. Nevertheless, at the root of the problem lies Russia's failure to 
resolve the problems of political and economic transformation following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. This impedes economic co-operation and makes Russia an 
unpredictable partner for Germany in all key areas of German-Russian economic 
relations: trade, direct investment, technical assistance and advice, financial co-operation 
and para-economic ties. The latter include such things as the joint housing construction 
project for military personnel returning to Russia from the former GDR. 
6. With regard to bilateral trade, reunited Germany is still Russia's most important trading 
partner in the "far" abroad, accounting for almost 15% of Russian foreign-trade turnover. 
By contrast, only 1.5% of German exports go to Russia and only slightly over 2% of its 
imports are Russian goods. Over the past few years the volume of trade has varied but on 
the whole has remained below its potential level. This is considerable given the positive 
tradition of trade between the two countries, the Russian economy's enormous modernisa-
tion requirements and the Russian habit of undertrading. There was something of an im-
provement in 1996, but a real trade boom is still being obstructed by the insufficient trans-
formation of the political system in Russia and by the slow pace of change in the Russian 
production structure. This means that the rather undynamic state of German-Russian trade 
may become permanent. 
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7. Russia also still comes rather low down the list of recipients of German foreign 
investment. The current barriers to investment can be summed up in a number of key 
phrases: a growing security problem on account of increasing criminality (the mafia 
syndrome); increasingly frequent instances of official corruption; a rapidly deteriorating 
record regarding the payment of bills and the honouring of contracts; the lack of a 
consistent economic policy and in particular a consistent foreign-trade policy; blatant 
contradictions between regulations designed to promote investment and tax legislation 
together with arbitrary interpretation of these by the authorities; and the wrangling over 
spheres of jurisdiction between the central government and the regions. German 
companies will continue to be reluctant to invest in Russia as long as there appears to be 
no marked improvement in the offing and as long as the Russian government continues to 
underestimate the importance of creating an attractive environment for investors. 
8. Since the end of the communist era the German government has supplied Russia with 
technical advice and assistance to the tune of DM 100 million annually. The intention 
here is not simply to transplant German methods. In line with the priorities set by Russia 
this assistance has concentrated on the following main areas: advice on economic policy 
aimed at creating conditions suitable for establishing medium-sized structures and 
businesses; assistance in enterprise restructuring, privatisation and disentanglement; the 
establishment of taxation, customs, insurance and banking systems; advice in the sphere 
of agriculture; training and further training in the field of economic law; assistance in 
establishing administrative structures; and advice on the labour market, social policy and 
environmental protection. The German government has also earmarked four main regions 
for special focus in its aid programme. These are the territory of Moscow and the cities 
and territories of Leningrad, Tyumen and Vladimir. In implementing this programme the 
German government is using funds from the "Kreditanstalt fürWiederaufbau". Other 
advisory projects are to be carried out by federal institutions and by the German business 
community. 
9. There can be no doubt that without the stabilisation of the economic situation, without 
sufficient progress in economic and political systemic transformation and without 
permanent structural change there can be no lasting improvement in external economic 
relations. This goes both for Russian foreign economic ties in general and for German-
Russian economic relations in particular. What is more, stabilisation and institutional and 
structural reform can be brought about only by Russia itself. Nevertheless, Western 
support in the form of a diverse programme of communication and co-operative 
partnership tailored to the special requirements of the Russian transformation process is 
necessary not least for political reasons. And if it is based on sound principles and 
efficiently co-ordinated then it will no doubt be of economic benefit as well. 
10. Despite the existence of structural shortcomings with more long-term implications and the 
continuing unsatisfactory state of the transformation process in Russia, the German gov-
ernment and the German business community have tried since 1992 to develop a series of 
strategies, institutions and mechanisms for promoting Russian-German trade relations and 
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economic co-operation. These include the conclusion of a number of formal agreements at 
government level and the creation of government-level institutions. One business 
organisation that has an increasing role to play is the German Centre for Industry and 
Commerce, which opened in Moscow on 5 March 1997. Finally, in the context of 
promoting economic ties, mention should be made of the various instruments for trade 
financing, such as the traditional Hermes-export guarantee companies as well as other 
newer instruments of finance. 
11. If one draws up a balance of the structural givens and the efforts being made to bring 
about political and economic change, then "best-case" and "worst-case" scenarios can be 
constructed for both Russian external economic relations in general and German-Russian 
economic relations in particular. At the most optimistic end of the scale is a scenario in 
which successful systemic transformation and rapid structural reform bring about a 
reversal of the trend in political co-operation. The "worst-case" scenario envisages the 
international marginalisation of Russia as a result of persistent if not indeed worsening 
internal destabilisation. While the optimistic scenario at present appears to be almost 
inconceivable, the pessimistic scenario, unfortunately, remains a gloomy possibility and 
must therefore be taken into account as an economic and political security risk. The most 
realistic scenario would appear to lie somewhere in the middle: i. e., stabilisation at a low 
level with alternating upswings and downswings. This scenario is based on the premise 
that in the absence of a clear or stable political profile on the part of those in power, 
Russia will continue to "muddle along" in its attempts to bring about transformation and 
society will simply adapt. For German partners this would mean that while opportunities 
exist for co-operation and trade, many ventures would be associated with a high degree of 
uncertainty. In other words, doing business with Russia continues to require a great 
willingness to take risks, a talent for improvisation, a detailed knowledge and continual 
observation of the socio-economic environment as well as reliable partners on the spot. 
 
